日本成人动画

讲座题目：When Public Signals Backfire: Strategic Disclosure and Information Crowd-Out（当公共信号适得其反：策略性披露与信息挤出）

讲座时间：2026年6月29日（周一） 14:00-15:30

讲座地点：日本成人动画 明德主楼734会议室

主讲人：Ginger Zhe Jin 马里兰大学

讲座简介：

We study how voluntary disclosure responds to a correlated public signal when receivers are partially naive. We develop a disclosure framework in which the public signal shifts naive receivers’ interpretation of silence, and derive a closed-form disclosure threshold that nests classical unraveling as a special case. The model predicts that a favorable public signal crowds out voluntary disclosure and can leave receivers with less information than they would obtain absent the signal. We test these predictions in a laboratory experiment that varies the correlation between the private state and the public signal across treatments. Disclosure falls as the public signal becomes more favorable, and the decline is amplified by stronger correlation. Receiver guesses upon non-disclosure rise correspondingly, departing from the rational benchmark in the direction of the public signal. When the public signal is favorable and its correlation with private information is strong, receivers may infer less from non-disclosure than they would in the absence of any public signal. Consequently, mandating correlated public signals can, under certain conditions, reduce rather than enhance market transparency. This finding carries a cautionary message for policymakers concerned with information concealment but nonetheless limited to mandating correlated signals.

主讲人简介：

金哲（Ginger Zhe Jin），马里兰大学帕克分校经济学系尼尔·莫斯科维茨讲席教授，主要研究方向为信息不对称对市场绩效的影响，以及如何通过优化数据、信息披露与政策设计来强化竞争、保护消费者并激励创新。她在经济学、管理学及市场营销学顶级期刊上发表大量高影响力论文，相关成果为消费者保护与数字市场监管领域的政策讨论提供了重要参考。

金哲教授目前担任《国际产业组织杂志》主编、《产业经济学杂志》咨询委员会委员、产业组织学会董事会成员，自2012年起担任美国国家经济研究局（NBER）研究员。她曾任美国联邦贸易委员会经济局局长、亚马逊学者与资深高级经济学家，并多次受邀在国际学术与政策论坛发表演讲。